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No. 3.
Report of Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. Army, commanding First Army Corps.
OR. Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 1038 - 1044
HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Camp, near Crab Orchard, Ky.
October 18, 1862.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with written instructions from you, dated October 7, 8 p.m., and reaching me at my camp at Mackville, Ky., at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of the 8th instant, I marched at 5 a.m. on the Perryville road. I had but a portion of my corps with me - Rousseau's and Jackson's divisions - the Second Division, under General Sill, having been detached to march upon Frankfort, Ky. The Tenth Division (General Jackson's) was entitled to the advance, but it being composed entirely of new troops, I ordered General Rousseau's division to take the lead. General Rousseau was ordered to march with great caution, I having heard previously that the enemy were in force at Harrodsburg; also your letter informing me that the enemy would resist your advance into Perryville; also that you intended to attack them that day. Hearing artillery in the morning, our march was hastened. Mackville is equidistant from Perryville and Harrodsburg - distance, 10 miles. My instructions required me to advance on the Perryville road until I reached a point 3 or 3 ½ miles of Perryville or until I came up abreast with Gilbert's corps. The head of my column reached the point designated at 10:30 a.m. General Rousseau advanced his cavalry and a portion of his infantry to the front in order to see if the ground was clear, the artillery (Loomis' battery) being halted on the hill in rear. General Rousseau soon sent me word that the enemy was reported advancing in force on the position assigned my corps. I then rode forward and examined the ground, and saw a few of the enemy skirmishing with the left of Gilbert's corps. My attention was then directed to General Gilbert's left. I saw his infantry in line about 400 or 500 yards to our right. I called General Rousseau's attention to this fact, marked out my line of battle, and ordered him to form on it, having directed Loomis' battery to be brought up and put in position on a commanding piece of ground to the left and near Russell's house (called Clarke's on your map). I had previously ordered General Rousseau to throw forward a line of skirmishers to examine the woods on our left and front; also sending Captain Wickliffe, with his company of the Second Kentucky Volunteer Cavalry, to reconnoiter the ground on the left of the skirmishers. General Gay's cavalry was making a reconnaissance in front and toward Perryville. I was then well satisfied that the enemy that had engaged Gilbert's left had retired from the field.
I then informed General Rousseau that my instructions required me to report in person to General Buell; that I was about to leave the field, but would return in a short time. I had given particular instructions to Capt. J. A. Campbell, my assistant adjutant-general, to post General Jackson's two brigades on a commanding piece of ground immediately to the right of the Mackville and Perryville road, and to hold them there in column, so that they could be moved in any direction that occasion required. I then galloped off to report to General Buell, whose headquarters were about 2 ½ miles in rear and right of my line. Having reported, I then received verbal instructions from General Buell to make a reconnaissance down to Chaplin River. I immediately returned to my troops, finding that General Rousseau had advanced the line on the right, occupying a commanding ridge about 800 yards in front and to the left of Russell's house. The enemy had placed three batteries in position and were firing upon his line; Loomis' and Simonson's batteries were replying. There being then no infantry of the enemy in sight, I sent an order for these batteries to cease firing and economize their ammunition. The command suffering greatly for water, I then prepared to make the reconnaissance toward Chaplin River, as ordered. Having been informed by my guide, Capt. Beverly D. Williams, acting assistant quartermaster on General Jackson's staff, and also by Col. L. A. Harris, commanding the Ninth Brigade, that by moving a short distance to the left of the Perryville road I could get high commanding ground for a portion of my line, I went forward in person to the high ground overlooking a portion of Chaplin River, advanced to within 600 yards of' the river, and saw the water. Having previously ordered a portion of the Thirty-third Ohio Volunteers into the woods on the right as skirmishers to ascertain if any enemy was present in that vicinity, I then sent for Generals Jackson and Terrill, showed them the water, marked their line of battle, and ordered a battery to be posted on this line, with strong support. General Terrill was ordered to advance a body of skirmishers cautiously down the slope of the hill to the water as soon as the line was formed.
During my presence on this ground no enemy was seen, save some rebel cavalry on the opposite hills, across the river, who I suppose were threatening my train in the rear. A few well-directed shots from Stone's First Kentucky Battery, posted to the left and rear of this position, put them to flight. Not being apprehensive of an attack, left this position and moved toward the right of the line. This was about 1:30 p.m. in the day.
At 2 p.m. an attack was made by the enemy on the skirmishers of the Thirty-third Ohio Volunteers. I then ordered the remainder of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, to support the line; also the Second Ohio Volunteers to support the Thirty-third.
My line of battle at this moment was formed as follows: The right of Rousseau's division rested near a barn on the right of the Perryville and Mackville road, extending to the left, on a commanding ridge, through corn field (the corn being cut and shucked), to the skirt of woods occupied by the Second and Thirty-third Ohio Volunteers. The right Terrill's brigade, of Jackson's division, resting on some woods running along to the left, on the commanding ground overlooking a portion of Chaplin River to the north, his left forming a crotchet to the rear, in order to occupy the high ground on his left and rear. Starkweather's brigade and Stone’s and Bush's batteries, of Rousseau's division were posted to the left and rear of Jackson's left, on high, commanding ground. Webster's brigade, of Jackson's division, was posted to the left of Russell's house, and in the rear of the center of Rousseau's line, on the right.
The attack on my line now became general. My attention was directed principally to the left, where the attack was most fiercely made. I had no apprehension about my right, as it rested near Gilbert's left. A fierce attack being made on Terrill's brigade, General Jackson being killed at the first fire, this brigade in a few moments gave way in confusion, General Terrill doing everything in the power of a man to steady them.
At this juncture, at 2.30 p.m., seeing that I was assailed by at least three times my numbers, I dispatched my aide-de-camp, First Lieut. L. M. Hosea, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry, to General Sheridan, commanding Gilbert’s left division, to request him to look to my right and see that it was not turned.
At 3 p.m. I dispatched Capt. Horace N. Fisher, of my staff, to the nearest commander of troops for assistance. He first met General Schoepf, marching at the head of his division, and reported my condition to him. General Schoepf expressed a desire to come up, replying that he was moving to the front for some purpose, and requested Captain Fisher to see General Gilbert, who was riding with the column. Captain Fisher then reported to General Gilbert that my entire command was engaged and the reserves were all in line and the safety of my corps was compromised. General Gilbert referred this officer to General Buell, to whom this officer reported at 3.30 p.m.
I also dispatched another aide, Capt. W. T. Hoblitzell, to General Schoepf, commanding the First Division and reserve of Gilbert's corps or to the commander of the nearest troops in the rear to inform him of I; condition and ask for troops.
I remained in rear of my left center until I saw the enemy's right completely routed and driven back by the gallant brigade of Starkweather, so admirably posted for the work they performed so well. I then galloped to the right of the line, but only in time to see it turned by a large force of the enemy. I then ordered Colonel Webster, of the Ninety-eighth Ohio, to move his troops to the right and repel this attack, if possible. It was in obeying this order that this gallant officer received a mortal wound. Retiring to Russell's house, I ordered my chief of artillery, Maj. C. S. Cotter, to bring up a section of artillery to stop their advance. This was done promptly. The guns were well handled, but could not stop this determined attack.
At this time the right of Rousseau's line was compelled to fall back to prevent it from being enveloped by the enemy. The enemy then placed a battery in the open field, about 800 yards from Russell's house, near Bolton's [Bottom’s] barn. The fire from this battery was so heavy that the point near Russell's house could not be held. Loomis' battery, having exhausted all its long-range ammunition, had been retired from its position in the afternoon to a commanding ridge about 150 yards in rear of Russell's house and on the right of the Perryville road, supported by three companies of the Michigan Mechanics and Engineers, commanded by Major Hopkins. I ordered Captain Loomis to reserve his canister for close work. This battery opened fire and repulsed this wicked attack for the first time. I then went to the point where the Dicksville and Springfield road crosses the Mackville and Perryville road. Near this point I met Captain Hoblitzell, with a brigade of General Robert B. Mitchell’s division. This brigade was commanded by Colonel Gooding, of the Twenty-second Indiana, and consisted of his own regiment, the Fifty-ninth and Seventy-fifth Illinois Volunteers, and Capt. O. F. Pinney's Fifth Wisconsin Battery. I ordered the posting of his infantry, and then placed Captain Pinney's battery in position near the cross-roads and in a small skirt of timber to the right.
Gooding's attack, assisted by Pinney's battery, drove back the enemy and reoccupied the position at Russell's house. At this moment Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman reported to me with his brigade, of Schoepf's division. It was now nearly dark. He posted his battery on the right of Pinney's and opened fire. I then conducted his brigade to a position on the right and front of these batteries. The two battalions of the Eighteenth Regulars, under Maj. Frederick Townsend, were posted on a commanding ridge in an open field, the right resting on a wood; the Ninth Ohio on the right of Townsend, the right resting on a field. The other regiments of this brigade were in the second line and supporting the batteries. The line of Steedman's brigade was about 200 yards to the rear and right of Russell's house. By this time it was dark and the firing had ceased on both sides.
I remained in front of Steedman's line until 9 p. m., when I rode to the left and found the line there had been retired by General Rousseau. Believing that the enemy would renew the attack at daylight I ordered him to throw his line back, his left resting upon the Mackville and Perryville road, and his line extending to the right, on commanding ground, to the left of Steedman's brigade. This movement was executed about 12 o'clock at night. When General Terrill's brigade gave way, a portion of his troops fell back with him to the position occupied by Stone's and Bush's batteries, and at this point, when in the act of rallying his broken troops, at 4 p.m. he was struck in the side by the fragment of a shell, carrying away a portion of his left lung. He died at 11 p.m. When Terrill's brigade gave way seven guns of Parsons' eight-gun battery fell into the hands of the enemy. At 6 p.m. four of the guns of Harris' Nineteenth Indiana Battery also fell into the hands of the enemy.
The posting of Starkweather's brigade and Stone's and Bush's batteries saved my left and secured to us the Mackville road, upon which stood our entire ammunition train and ambulances. The ground to the right of the road being rough and rugged prevented the train from being taken off the road and parked.
I have previously stated that the firing on both sides ceased at dark. The enemy posted their pickets about 50 yards from ours, but the main body escaped during the night, and with such precipitation that they left their dead and wounded and could not carry the guns captured from the new batteries from the field. The guns were all recovered next morning, except two Napoleon guns of Parsons' battery, that were kindly exchanged by the enemy for two 6-pounder field guns. The enemy retreated across Chaplin River to the Harrodsburg turnpike, about 1 ½ miles distant from the battle-field; thence to Harrodsburg.
The battlefield was a chosen one for the enemy. They marched from Harrodsburg to give our army battle at or near Perryville. The ground upon which the battle was fought was very much broken by hills and deep ravines, which afforded every facility to them for concealing their troops. I was assailed by at least three divisions of the enemy. The bluffs and dry channels of Chaplin River and Doctor's Fork afforded them every advantage for concealing and massing large bodies of troops.
I have since been reliably informed that General Bragg commanded the enemy in person and that Polk's and Hardee's corps were present upon the field.
Thus ends my account of the part taken in the battle of Chaplin Hills by my corps, the bloodiest battle of modern times for the number of troops engaged on our side. Rousseau had present on the, field 7,000; Jackson, 5,500; the brigade of Gooding amounted to about 1,500. The battle was principally fought by Rousseau's division, and if there are or ever were better soldiers than the old troops engaged I have neither seen nor read of them.
Great discrimination must be exercised in making a perfectly fair statement respecting the conduct of the new regiments; exposed as some of them were to a terrific fire at the onset of the enemy, it would be extraordinary to expect in them the steadiness and composure of veterans. It was also clearly perceptible that the resolution and obstinate resistance displayed by the old troops in the same brigade or in close proximity had a salutary effect in animating and encouraging the new troops; for instance, the Ninth Brigade. When the Second and Thirty-third Ohio, Thirty-eighth Indiana, and Tenth Wisconsin fought so well, I was proud to see the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-eighth Ohio vie with their brethren in deeds of heroism. Commanders have found occasion for severe reflection on individuals, whose conduct did not entirely justify the confidence reposed in them by their State and country. These cases, happily but few, compel me the more strongly to awaken the attention of our authorities to a more rigid and careful selection of officers who may join to their other qualifications the essential ones of courage and honor. The material of the new levies is evidently as good as in the old regiments. My apology for the misbehavior of some on this day is want of discipline and confidence in their field and line officers.
If it were not a great pleasure my duty compels me to call the attention of my superiors and my Government to the conspicuous gallantry and good conduct of Brig. Gen. L. H. Rousseau on this hotly contested field. The manner of posting his left and the way it was maintained render him one of the most conspicuous lights of the war.
The attention of my superiors is called to the good conduct and gallantry of Col. L. A. Harris, Second Ohio, commanding Ninth Brigade; Col. J. C. Starkweather; of the First Wisconsin, commanding Twenty-eighth Brigade; also Col. W. H. Lytle, of the Tenth Ohio, commanding Seventeenth Brigade. These officers deserve promotion.
Captain Loomis, of the First Michigan Battery, handled his battery with great success and ability. Capt. O. F. Pinney, of the Fifth Wisconsin Battery, greatly distinguished himself during the close of the action, as did the entire brigade of Colonel Gooding, sent me from General Robert B. Mitchell's division.
For favorable mention of other officers and men I refer you to the reports of General Rousseau; also to the adjutants-general of Generals Jackson and Terrill and Colonel Webster, herewith inclosed.
To my personal staff, Lieut. Co1. J. V. Bomford, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry; Lieut. Col. E. Bassett Langdon, First Ohio Volunteers; Capt. J. A. Campbell, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. W. T. Hoblitzell, aide-de-camp; Second Lieut. S. W. Davies, First Ohio Volunteers, aide-de-camp; First Lieut. L. M. Hosea, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry, aide-de-camp; Maj. Caleb Bates, volunteer aide-de-camp; Capt. H. N. Fisher, volunteer aide-de-camp, and Capt. James P. Collier, volunteer aide-de-camp, I return my sincere thanks for their conspicuous gallantry and intelligence displayed on the field of battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Bomford was twice wounded while posting a regiment in line.
My orderlies, Privates Isaac Bailey, Second Indiana Cavalry; George L. Richardson, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers; Henry Kline, First Ohio Volunteers; Avery Lapham, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, and Privates G. Benning Jenness, William Edwards, and Harvey Knowles, escort, behaved with coolness and bravery on the field, and I recommend them to their superiors for promotion.
To Surg. G. B. Beebe, medical director of my corps, my thanks are due for his good conduct on the field and the kind care he has taken of the wounded. Favorable mention is also made of Surgeons Marks, Tenth Wisconsin; L. J. Dixon, First Wisconsin; Williams, One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteers; Wright, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania; Beckwith, Thirty-eighth Indiana; Sinnet, Ninety-fourth Ohio, and Fowler. Also Assistant Surgeons Taft, One hundred and fifth Ohio; Devendorf, First Wisconsin; Albright, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania; Mitchell, Tenth Wisconsin; Reeve and Fuller, Twenty-first Wisconsin, and Shannon, of the Second Ohio.
Maj. C. S. Cotter, First Ohio Artillery, my chief of that arm (artillery), behaved with conspicuous gallantry and good judgment during the entire action. He was unfortunately taken prisoner after dark.
Capt. Beverly D. Williams, assistant quartermaster, was my guide during the entire day. The battle was fought near his birthplace. He was of inestimable service to me.
Lieut. M. B. Gratz and Volunteer Aide Henry Duncan, of Kentucky, of Jackson's staff, reported to me for duty after the fall of their gallant general.
Lieut. C. C. Parsons, Fourth U. S. Artillery, also reported to me for duty after his battery had fallen into the hands of the enemy. He behaved with great bravery the entire day and the loss of his battery was no fault of his; he remained with it until deserted by every man around him.
Capt. W. P. Anderson, assistant adjutant-general to General Terrill, also reported to me after the fall of his chief, and behaved with coolness and bravery during the day.
My casualties during the day were very large. The nation is called upon to mourn the loss of such spirits as Jackson, Terrill, Webster, Jouett, Campbell, Berryhill, Herrell, and others, who fell upon this bloody field.
A list of killed and wounded of the Third and Tenth Divisions is herewith inclosed.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
A. McD. McCook, Major-General, Commanding First Corps.
Col. J. B. FRY, Chief of Staff.
Buell to McCook; Concentration Order
OR. Vol. 16, Pt. 1, p. 50
OCTOBER 7 [1862] - 8 p.m.
GENERAL: The Third Corps (Gilbert's) is within 3½ miles of Perryville, the cavalry being nearer, probably within 2½ miles. From all the information gained to-day it seems probable that the enemy will resist our advance into the town. They are said to have a strong force in and near the place. There is no water here, and we will get but little, if any, until we get it at Perryville. We expect to attack and carry the place to-morrow. March at 3 o'clock precisely to-morrow morning without fail, and move up till the head of your column gets to within about 3 or 3½ miles of Perryville; that is to say, until you are abreast of the Third Corps. The left of this corps rests near Bottom's place. Perhaps Captain [Beverly] Williams, Jackson's cavalry, will know where it is. From the point of the road Gilbert is now on across direct to your road is about 2½ or 3 miles. When the head of your column gets to the vicinity designated (3 or 3½ miles from town) halt and form it in order of battle, and let the rear close well up; then let the men rest in position and be made as comfortable as possible, but do not permit them to scatter. Have the country on your front examined, a reconnaissance made, and collect all the information possible in regard to the enemy and the country and roads in your vicinity, and then report in person as quickly as practicable to these headquarters. If your men have an opportunity to get water of any kind they must fill their canteens, and the officers must caution them particularly to use it in the most sparing manner. Send to the rear every wagon and animal which is not required with your column. All the usual precautions must be taken and preparations made for action. Keep all teams back except ammunition and ambulances. Nothing has been heard from you to-day. Send orderlies by bearer to learn the locality of these headquarters. The general desires to see Captain Williams, Jackson's cavalry, by 7 o'clock in the morning at these headquarters.
Respectfully, &c.,
JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
Excerpts from the Testimony of Maj. Gen. A. McD. McCook, Commanding, First Corps, Army of the Ohio.
Transcript from Phonographic Notes of the Buell Court of Inquiry.
OR Vol. 16, Pt. 1, P. 87 - 91, 98 - 127
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. State, if you please, your position in the Army of the United States.
I am a major-general of volunteers since the 17th of July, 1862.
Question. You will state, if you please, what part of that time you were under the command of Major-General Buell, and especially during the invasion of Kentucky by Bragg, and all you know about the expedition following.?
[Edited]
At Louisville the army was organized into corps, consisting of three divisions. I was placed in command of the First Corps, consisting of my own (Second) division, General Rousseau's division (Third), and General Jackson’s division (Eleventh), consisting of raw levies. I don't exactly remember the number of days we were at Louisville in reorganizing, but we moved at the earliest possible moment supplies could be obtained, and as it was I marched with a deficiency of canteens and haversacks. We marched without baggage. I think one wagon to a regiment was allowed to carry officers' blankets and a few rations. Soldiers had mess-pans made and carried them on their persons. Regiments that were supplied with cooking utensils one wagon was allowed to carry them.
When we marched from Louisville my corps was divided. Sill's division was ordered to march on Shelbyville pike toward Frankfort. My other division marched 6 miles on Bardstown pike, then turned to the left on Taylorsville pike, and camped that night beyond Jeffersontown. I was ordered next day to march to a point, the junction of Shelbyville and Taylorsville and Louisville and Taylorsville pikes. It was absolutely impossible for me to encamp there, as the streams were dry. I marched that night 5 miles farther, to Taylorsville, on Salt River. I remained at Taylorsville next day; the day after marched to Bloomfield. I was kept in communication with General Buell, and he prescribed the day's march for each corps from day to day. The orders were for each corps to have four orderlies at his headquarters, so as to enable him to communicate with the different corps from day to day.
I remained at Bloomfield with my two divisions from Saturday until Monday morning. While at Bloomfield I received instructions from General Buell to be ready to march to the support of Sill in case he should fail at Frankfort or to be ready to march to the support of Sill to operate with the main body in an attack on Bragg. I then received an order to march from Bloomfield to Harrodsburg, there to form a junction with Sill at or near Harrodsburg. I sent that order to General Sill and told him to meet me on a certain day. This order was countermanded. Sill was ordered to march by way of Lawrenceburg and Chaplintown, and then follow my route, by way of Chaplintown, Willisburg, and Mackville, to the position assigned me at Perryville. General Buell sent me a guide, Capt. Beverly [D.] Williams, who bore an order. The order was an optional one to march by way of Willisburg and Mackville to Perryville, and if that was impracticable to march by way of Springfield. Captain Williams informed me he could carry me through by way of Willisburg and Mackville. I left Bloomfield Monday and marched to Chaplin River, 1½ miles beyond Chaplintown. On Tuesday I marched to Mackville - on the 7th of October. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 8th I received a letter of instructions relating to my position in line at Perryville, ordering me to march at 3 o'clock a.m. I marched at 5 o'clock a.m., my division being separated about a mile on account of water. I reached a point designated for my line about 9 o'clock a.m. near Perryville. Was ordered to take position about 3 miles from Perryville.
When I arrived at the point designated General Rousseau went forward and reconnoitered the ground. I saw General Gilbert's line, his left skirmishing with the enemy, although no enemy were visible except a few in the woods and along the fence.
The enemy were driven from the front. I sent my aide, Lieutenant Hosea, to see whose troops they were. He returned and reported they were Colonel Greusel's. I called General Rousseau's attention to the left of General Gilbert's line, and also Captain Loomis', who was Rousseau's chief of artillery, and marked the line of battle for them. I was a total stranger to the country. Captain B. D. Williams, who was my guide, was called off to General Buell's headquarters at 7 o'clock that a.m. I marked the line of battle of General Rousseau, and Captain Loomis replied they understood it perfectly. I commenced forming it, and selected the position for Loomis' battery myself. The right of my line was not over 350 yards from General Gilbert's left. The line was then being formed - Rousseau's division - the line being marked out for it. General Jackson's division had not yet arrived on the ground. On the march I picketed all the roads leading from Mackville leading to my rear. General Gay in the mean time was making a reconnaissance with cavalry.
Our march that day to Mackville had to be done carefully. I had flankers and skirmishers thrown out. Jackson's division, being composed of raw troops, understood their duties imperfectly, and consequently could not march rapidly. I ordered General Rousseau to reconnoiter my front with skirmishers. He ordered the Tenth Ohio, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. I gave orders to Major Campbell, my assistant adjutant-general, to post General Jackson's division on a high piece of ground to the right of the Mackville road with regiments doubled on the center, with a view to move them in any direction. I then informed General Rousseau that my order was to report to General Buell in person and that I was about to leave the field (11 a.m.), but would return in a short time. I would state that previously I had a conversation with Captain Long, who was stationed in that part of the field as a picket. He told me he had been there and had only seen a little force of the enemy's cavalry; that General Gilbert's troops had been engaged with the enemy, but not in any force. General Buell's written instructions led me to believe he was going to attack the enemy at Perryville.
I left the field and reported to General Buell in person, whose headquarters were 2½ miles from my line. I reached his headquarters about 12:30 o'clock I reported that my line was formed; my right was about 350 yards from Gilbert's left; also reported my men wanted water badly, the water the night before being scarce and bad at that. He ordered me to return to my line and make a reconnaissance down to the Chaplin River and obtain water for my men. I left his tent in company with his chief of staff, Colonel Fry. I asked Colonel Fry who was down in Perryville. He replied Hardee was there with two divisions. I then bade them good-by, and said I was going down to drink at the river and asked him to go. I returned to my line and found that General Rousseau had placed a couple of batteries in position and replied to three batteries that had opened on him at long range. I rode up to where the batteries were, and not seeing any of the enemy's infantry, I ordered no more ammunition to be wasted. I was then informed by my guide, Captain Williams, and Colonel Harris, commanding Ninth Brigade, that if I would ride off to the left a few hundred yards on the Mackville road I would get a position that would command Chaplin River and could see the water. I went forward in person, examined the ground, and saw the water. Sent for Generals Jackson and Terrill, told them what I was ordered to do, showed them the water, marked out, a line for them, which was a continuation of the left of Harris' brigade, Rousseau's division, right resting on a wood and line running along a high commanding ridge, and at the left of the line was a crochet to the rear, in order to hold the high ground. General Jackson replied to me, as did also General Terrill, that they understood the line. They had previously sent for the troops to place in that position, and were then on the march to this position. I also ordered General Terrill as soon as his line was formed, to advance a line of skirmishers down to the water. He replied to me, "I'll do it, and that's my water." The only enemy in sight at that time was about 400 or 500 cavalry on the other side of Chaplin River (1 o'clock). Water was about 600 yards in front of my line. This cavalry was driven away by Stone's battery, Starkweather's brigade, that was put in position on a high ridge to the left of my line. I had previously ordered two companies Thirty-third Ohio into the woods as skirmishers to reconnoiter the woods. I ordered General Jackson to superintend this reconnaissance, and he replied that he would. I told him I would then ride down into these woods and see what they were about, as I heard nothing from them. General Jackson requested me not to go, saying that Providence had been kind to me, and that some lurking scoundrel might shoot me. I told him I would not go, and rode to the right in the rear of the skirmishers, and in a few minutes the firing commenced between the Second and Thirty-third Ohio skirmishers and the enemy.
About 2 o'clock an assault was made upon my entire line, the heaviest being on my left and center. In about half an hour after I left Jackson, Williams reported to me Jackson was killed. As soon as I found the assault was going to be a general one I dispatched an aide to General Sheridan to see to my right that it was not turned. About 3 o'clock, when I found the enemy were outnumbering me, I sent an aide to the nearest commander for assistance (Captain Fisher). He met General Schoepf on the road marching to the battle-field. Captain Fisher was referred to General Gilbert, who was with General Schoepf's command, and was referred by General Gilbert to General Buell. At; 3:30 o'clock I dispatched another aide, Captain Hoblitzell, to General Schoepf, to tell him my condition. The same time I dispatched Major Bates, of my staff, to report to General Buell my condition. In the mean time Terrill's brigade, of Jackson's division, which consisted of all raw troops, had given way, but Starkweather's brigade, being so admirably posted, drove the enemy back on the left. I remained in the left center of my line until the enemy were driven in confusion from the left center and center of my line and then galloped to the right, and arrived just in time to see my right turned by a heavy force of the enemy. It was then and there most of my casualties occurred that day. I ordered two regiments of Webster's brigade, which had been posted in the rear of the right center of Rousseau's line, to move to the right and repel the assault. I galloped to Russell's house, where my headquarters had been during the morning, and ordered my chief of artillery to bring up a section of artillery and repel this advance of the enemy. The section was opened, but they opened a battery about 600 yards from us and opened such a heavy fire upon that point that the battery was brought away. Loomis' battery had exhausted all its long-range ammunition and had been retired 100 yards in rear of Russell's house. I rode to the battery, and ordered Captain Loomis, as soon as the enemy came close enough, to open upon them with canister. He double-charged his Parrott guns and did it handsomely. I then rode back to where the Mackville and Perryville and Springfield-Dicksville roads cross.
(Continued December 9, 1862)
I then proceeded to the point where the Mackville and Perryville road crosses the Springfield and Dicksville road. There I met my aide-de-camp, Captain Hoblitzell.
Colonel Gooding commanded the brigade. He reported to me, and I ordered him to his position with the regiments and told him what to do. Capt. O. F. Pinney, Fifth Wisconsin Battery [also reported], and I posted him in a position near the skirts of the wood near the crossing to the right of Mackville and Perryville road. The fight still continued fiercely. This was about 5 o'clock in the evening or half past 5; dark came on about 6. General James [B.] Steedman, who commands a brigade, also reported to me that he had his brigade ready for duty. I ordered his batteries into position to the right of pickets and posted his infantry to the right of these batteries. The brigade was formed in two lines, extending nearly to where Colonel [Dan] McCook's brigade was in camp. About the time I got this brigade posted it was quite dark and the firing had ceased on both sides.
I remained in front of this line, watching the movements of the enemy, till half past nine. I established my headquarters about 70 yards in front of this line and about 150 yards in rear of Russell's house, where I had been in the morning. I remained on the right in front of this line because I thought the main attack would be made in that direction. The moon came up, a bright moon, and they could have fought as well as by day. Finding there was no motion or drum movements of the enemy that I could discover, I rode to the left of my line to see how it had retired. This was about half past nine at night. I went to the left, could not find General Rousseau, but found that he had retired his line from the position they had occupied in the evening and afternoon. The enemy's camp fires were around the lines, almost surrounding his position, and our pickets were 40 yards from each other. They were talking. I there saw Colonel Starkweather, who commanded a brigade, and Colonel Harris, and Colonel Hall, One hundred and fifth Ohio. I asked them what kind of a position they were in. They said almost surrounded by the enemy; that the pickets were within 40 yards of each other; that the rebel cavalry threatened them on the left; that Bush's and Stone's batteries were in a position to be taken at any moment in case the enemy made a heavy assault.
I determined that the line should he changed, but from what I saw I did not think the enemy would attack till daylight. My reason for this was they came from Harrodsburg to give us battle. I immediately rode off to select a stronger line, to retire these batteries and Rousseau's infantry to a better position. I selected it. General Rousseau then rode up. He had been at General Buell’s headquarters. I carried him with me to select the position for his line and marked it, with the left on Mackville road and the right resting on the point where Steedman's was posted on high ground. This was a good position. During the night I had succeeded in taking off all my ammunition and ambulances and hospital wagons. I succeeded in the night in getting off that road.
General Buell sent me word in the evening late that if I had to retreat to retreat by the Dicksville and Springfield road, which led to his headquarters; therefore the Mackville road was of no importance to me. This was about half past nine. I told General Rousseau that I considered this change of line was a very hazardous one, and, if the representations were correct, as soon as they heard the first gun there would be an attack made on them. I told him not to form the movement yet; that General Buell had sent for me; he wished to see me. I told him I would go to General Buell and ask for more assistance to keep a certain position to cover this change of line. Then we started off to General Buell's headquarters, and reached there about 12 o'clock at night. I found General Thomas at General Buell's headquarters. I reported to him in regard to my fight in the afternoon. I told him what the condition of affairs was and told him where the line was. He replied that I was cut off from him. I told him yes, from the Dicksville and Springfield road, where General Rousseau had retired the line. I asked him for two brigades for about two hours; that I wanted them to hold a certain position in order that I could change my line. I then asked him for one brigade. He positively declined giving me two brigades, and I then asked him for one. He told me I was cut off. When I was just coming off the ground General Rousseau's aide-de-camp told me the change had been made. The line of battle which had been formed by my two divisions was the best possible one that could have been selected in my opinion. I examined the ground, and I examined it six days after, when all the facts connected with the battle were known, and I conscientiously satisfied that it was the best disposition that could have been made of those troops in order to have saved my communication on the Mackville road. The posting of Starkweather's brigade was admirable. He posted the brigade there himself. I did not see the posting of that brigade myself. General Rousseau deserved the credit of it.
The enemy were whipped on the left thoroughly; they were routed on my center, routed on my right. I was badly whipped. I believe re-enforcements could have been sent me without prejudice to the cause; and I have since said that had I my old division that I fought with at Shiloh I would have been responsible for Bragg's escape that night.
General BUELL. I object to this expression of feeling.
The WITNESS. I have no feeling in this matter toward General Buell, but have stood by him throughout his removal from the Army of the Ohio.
General BUELL. My objection is that it is an expression of opinion, or rather all expression of feeling with regard to the matter, based upon circumstances that developed themselves after the event. I do not wish it to be understood that it is an expression of prejudice or of feeling toward me.
The court then cleared for deliberation.
Upon being opened the judge-advocate announced that the objection was not sustained; opinions of corps and division commanders being considered important to the Commission to enable it to come to a conclusion upon the matters before it.
The WITNESS. I will state, in reference to the conversation or report, that I believed the enemy would attack me at daylight, and General Buell disagreed with me in opinion. He didn't think so. Next morning I received an order to close my line to the right and ordered Steedman's brigade to return to its command to General Schoepf.
General BUELL. Was that a written order?
The WITNESS. Well: sir, I think it was a pencil written order, a note from Colonel Fry. That order reached me and I closed my lines to the right, and Steedman's brigade went to join its proper division. I will also state that about the time Steedman's brigade was coming to my assistance I met Major Wright, who reported that his re-enforcements were there, and asked me how I was getting along. I replied to him that I was doing the best I could with the troop. I had, and with these troops I thought I could hold my position there. That was about 5:30; it was nearly dark. The next day my corps was ordered to advance and take a position to the right of Dicksville.
I wish to state something in addition. At the time that the attack was made upon me at the battle of Chaplin Hills the co-operation of General Gilbert's corps, I believe, would have secured a complete victory. My right was turned almost within view of his troops. But what his orders were in regard to these movements I know nothing. Co-operation there would have secured a victory in my opinion. I don't think General Gilbert was in front during the battle. I don't know whether he was or not, but I have inquired of his officers and they say he was not. I thought it was his duty to co-operate with me on that day. It is the duty of a general to relieve a brother general, whatever his orders may be.
The day after the battle of Perryville my line was thrown forward about 1 mile. I cannot be positive; I think it was the second day after the battle my line was thrown forward. I think I got the order, a written note, from the chief of staff. Next day we moved forward to the Harrodsburg pike, about 2½ miles, my command resting on the Harrodsburg pike. Next day I marched to Harrodsburg; from there to Fry's Springs, 3 miles; next day 6 miles beyond Danville, and the next day 2½ miles beyond Crab Orchard, where I halted.
The JUDGE-ADVOCATE. Have you the orders sent you, the memorandum spoken of in your evidence, and the report of your proceedings?
I have a report of the battle of Chaplin Hills. I have a number of memoranda.
Question. In reference to that Perryville fight, what was your force there?
My own force, including those guarding trains and everything, was about 13,000 men, but my actual force in battle was not more than about 10,000.
Question. You said in your narrative that you had a conversation with General Buell after the Perryville fight; did you give all that conversation?
I gave what I believed to be the substance of the conversation. I went to General Buell, and, picking up the map, explained the position of my lines. General Thomas was present, and also Capt. Beverly D. Williams, of my staff, who heard the conversation. I told General Buell I had had a very severe fight. He said he was surprised to hear of it and that he had not heard of it till 5 o'clock. He then talked with me at intervals. He was engaged in conversation with General Thomas as to whether we should attack the enemy in the morning or not. I explained to General Buell the position of my lines. I told him I had two batteries that had fought gallantly during the day in a very perilous situation. I told him the manner in which Rousseau had retired his line on the left; that the enemy had lit fires around him and in front of him; that the pickets were only about 40 yards apart; that there was a regiment of cavalry on the left threatening any movements that might be made, and that from appearances I believed I was surrounded. I asked General Buell for the loan of two brigades for two hours at furthest, to hold a certain position while I changed my lines to cover the movements. He told me I could not have them; he positively refused to give them to me. I then asked him if I could have one brigade. He told me I should not have another man. I was at that time very much vexed and provoked. I felt that I should have had the relief. I confidently believed that I should be attacked at daylight and I told General Buell so. It was evident to my mind that the enemy had come on to a chosen field to attack our army, and I supposed the battle would be renewed in the morning and attack if they were not attacked themselves. General Buell replied that he did not think he could be attacked.
Question. Did he give any reason for that belief?
He did not.
Question. Do you know now or did you know at the time the direction taken by the enemy after that fight? Do you know any reasons for the enemy's taking the route to Harrodsburg instead of falling back on Danville?
The matter is very simple. They were moving back to form a junction with Kirby Smith's force.
By General TYLER:
Question. Did Kirby Smith come to Harrodsburg to join them with his whole force?
Yes, sir.
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. Can yon give any reason for the delay that occurred after that fight in pursuing the enemy?
No reason whatever. I believe they should have been vigorously pursued next morning at daylight. I will state that my troops, who had fought all day without water, could have occupied the part of a reserve very well; better soldiers I never saw.
Question. Had you pushed across to Danville instead of following the enemy around by Harrodsburg what would have been the effect?
That the retreat would have been cut off. It might possibly have driven the enemy toward Louisville.
By General TYLER:
Question. They would have had to fight a battle?
Yes, sir.
Question. You stated in your examination that General Buell sent you orders that if you had to retreat to retreat on the line toward his headquarters?
Yes; to fall back from the Chaplin Hills.
Question. Did he explain to you any reason for retreating in that direction?
No sir; it was the only one left. I should have exposed my plan to the enemy by any other.
Question. You stated that you were not satisfied with the scattering of General Buell's army on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad?
Any man of judgment would say it would have taken 50,000 men to keep that railroad in running order. I never heard General Buell express his opinions about these things, but I never considered him responsible for that nor do I think his army ever did, and the facts so prove. General Buell's written instructions induced me to believe that he intended to attack the enemy at Perryville. His instructions were that on account of the want of water the enemy would oppose his entrance into that town.
The PRESIDENT. Were any special orders given you with respect to that attack?
None, except those I presented to the Commission, that I was to take my position there and ascertain what was in my front and not allow my troops to scatter and to form my line with my right resting on Gilbert near Bottom's house.
By General TYLER:
Question. You stated that the assault commenced at 2 o'clock?
Yes, sir; about, 2.
Question. Was there any movement of the enemy that induced you to believe the attack would be made?
I rode to the farthest point and reconnoitered. The enemy were concealed in the dry channels of Chaplin River and in mass there, and it was difficult to see anything unless you went down to the bluff and looked over. These facts I learned afterward, of course, by dear experience.
Question. You say you reported the attack on your lines at half past three?
I sent an aide-de-camp. My aide returned to the field afterward, but brought no orders. My orders were communicated to me by Major [J.M.] Wright, I think it was, on General Buell's staff, who arrived on the field that evening about half an hour before dark.
Question. What were the orders?
That in case I was compelled to fall back to fall back on the Springfield road, in anticipation of support. When Major Wright was in conversation these brigades appeared. Captain Hoblitzell was marching at the head and reported that he had a brigade marching to my support.
General TYLER. Had you been compelled by an overwhelming force to retreat toward General Buell's headquarters what would have been the condition of your army; would you have been sacrificed or fought your way back?
I would never have left with my troops alive. With the changes I had made during the night I could have retreated on the Springfield road.
By General ORD:
Question. On the march from Corinth was there much marauding or plundering?
No, sir; there was not. I never allowed it. Some time in August or September there was an order authorizing the appropriation of property for the use of the army received from Washington.
Question. Did that make any difference?
Yes, sir; it ruined the discipline of our army to a certain extent. It was the worst order that was ever published for a body of troops. General Pope's orders on the Potomac was the cause of it. Our soldiers read it and believed it. It will demoralize any army in the world. I never failed to give redress to those inhabitants who complained of depredations, and I arrested every field officer in one entire brigade for suffering their soldiers to burn rails to cook with. Of course there were more or less petty grievances that will occur in the march of an army through any country, but General Buell's orders were opposed to it.
Question. Did General Buell use vigorous efforts to correct this marauding after the publication of this order?
He always did. Not only on the marching of my division, but he has provoked me on many occasions by reprimanding my command when I thought he should have required me to do it. I have seen him do it personally and order men to be punished for it, and especially for straggling.
Question. Straggling is a necessary result of marauding, is it not?
No man did more to repress it than General Buell, and I am sorry to say that there are frightful causes of complaint now.
General BUELL. May I inquire if he has heard it charged against the Army of the Ohio that it was lawless?
No, sir.
By General ORD:
Question. Did this produce any feeling on the part of the officers toward General Buell?
I do not know whether it produced any feeling or not. The immediate commanders were responsible, for these things and it was on them depended the execution of the orders; on them the fault-finding would fall. I believe that General Buell's army was the best ever put in the field, and I have heard General Rosecrans say it was the best organized army that ever was, and that is my belief this day. There was never a more untiring general than General Buell. I never knew when he slept. I have been at his headquarters at all hours, but never found him asleep. I have spoken to him many times about it.
Question. Did you get the newspapers in your camp during the months of August and September?
We did not get them very frequently during that time, for I think the railroad was cut.
Question. Was it apprehended among the army that General Buell's conduct would be criticized in the newspapers?
I was under the impression that it would be. I have been abused by the Abolition press [in the] North and I hope I shall continue to be.
Question. Do you think the remarks of the newspapers had any influence in producing insubordination in the Army?
In one case I do. There was a pest of a correspondent in my division that I was after all the time, but could never catch. I think it would have an effect upon soldiers. I remember once General Buell was called an ass, but I never could find out who the correspondent was. As a rule I expel correspondents; they are not judges of what to publish and what to suppress. I believe they are the worst enemies of our Army, for I have seen publications that have given information respecting my movements known only to my officers high in command - facts in relation to the organization of my division and its movements. I know that correspondents complained bitterly because General Buell never encouraged them. The same complaint was made against me. I had the correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette arrested and put out of the army because he published things he had no business to. I will further state, in this country, above all others, it is a difficult thing to obtain anything 1ike satisfactory evidence of the position of the enemy, for their front is always covered with cavalry, and it is very difficult to get spies into their lines. I have always found it so, and there are no citizens on whom you can rely. Those who have information and are disposed to tell it are afraid to do so.
By General BUELL:
Question. Do you know of any intelligent man in the army who, with a knowledge of these circumstances, was in favor of attacking Bragg's army at Munfordville?
Not at that time; I never heard the matter discussed; I never talked with my equals in rank about the matter; I never suffered my juniors to criticize the commanding general's actions without hushing them up; that is, in my presence.
Question. Did you have occasion to silence the criticism of intelligent men on this subject?
I had occasion once to silence a colonel.
Question. Will you mention his name?
I should prefer not doing it unless compelled. It was Colonel Parrott, of the First Ohio Volunteers; Edward A. Parrott, I believe, is his name.
Question. Were you present at an assemblage of officers, or did you ever hear of an assemblage of officers, at which it was proposed to depose General Buell from the command of the army and to place General Thomas in command?
(Question objected to by judge - advocate.)
I never was present at any such meeting nor have I ever heard of it. It is information to me if it ever occurred.
Question. Is it a fact sufficiently notorious to be reasonably certain that the invasion of Kentucky by the force of General Bragg and Kirby Smith had for its object to seize the principal cities and hold the State?
I believe that was the intention. Kirby Smith's demonstrations in front of Cincinnati was a sufficient cause to make me think so, and with the anxiety expressed by the late General Nelson I was satisfied that Louisville was in great danger. I was not anxious about Louisville as much as Cincinnati, for I believed General Buell's army concentrated about Louisville could have whipped any given amount of men that could have been set up before them.
Question. In pursuing that object was it reasonable to suppose that the enemy counted the cost of it; that is, that he estimated the means of resistance he would have to meet?
I most certainly believe he did or he would have gone and taken the city.
Question. Was it to be supposed that he would abandon that object with a single partial engagement?
No, sir; I think it was the presence of General Buell's army in Kentucky that prevented him. I do not think that the repulse that the enemy got at Chaplin Hills, near Perryville, was sufficient to have driven him from the State.
Question. By what routes might the enemy have been expected to retreat from Kentucky if he had determined to retreat without further resistance?
There were three roads left open for him. He could have gone off by Danville, Stanford, Mount Vernon, and Cumberland Gap, and could have gone the route through Stanford and Somerset, or he might have crossed the Kentucky River and escaped by Mount Sterling into Western Virginia.
Question. Did the concentration of the enemy at Harrodsburg, either previously or subsequently to the battle of Perryville indicate an intention to retreat from the State precipitately?
It did not. The march to Harrodsburg did not indicate an abandonment of the State. My information led me to believe that they would fight at a place near Harrodsburg, and when they went to Camp Dick Robinson I confidently expected to have a fight there, their position being a very strong one.
Question. Supposing it had been assumed that the enemy designed to retreat after the battle of Perryville and that he designed to retreat by way of Cumberland Gap, please state what road or roads he must have taken from Camp Dick Robinson and what position an army should have taken to interrupt him.
Our army would either had to have gone via Crab Orchard to Mount Vernon to have intercepted him or the Lancaster route and to have cut them off on the Richmond route. I should have thought the army ought to have been near London.
Question. Suppose my army to have been directed on different points you have named, then, on the assumption that the enemy was retreating finally from the State, in what position would it have placed my line of communication, supposing the enemy to have been at Harrodsburg or in that region?
It would have placed them in possession of the enemy.
Question. Did the enemy in moving from Harrodsburg go through Danville at all?
No, sir; I don't think they did. I understand that a part of their cavalry did, but their army did not.
By General BUELL:
Question. General, will you please describe the character of the country bordering the Chaplin river, on both sides, north of Perryville, from there toward Harrodsburg, west of the Harrodsburg road, and of that region of country within a scope of, say, 10 miles west from the Harrodsburg road?
The bed of Chaplin River is a very deep one. It was dry with the exception of water standing in pools. The country immediately north of Perryville was a rough one. All the country between the Mackville and Perryville road and the Harrodsburg and Perryville turnpike was rough. There were winding approaches down to the bed of the Chaplin River and approaches from the river which led toward the Harrodsburg pike. Between Perryville and Harrodsburg there was a very strong position for the enemy. The country is rugged and rough. I do not know of any good road that connects the Mackville and Perryville with the Harrodsburg road.
Question. Is it a country in which an army could operate conveniently or from which it could extricate itself if defeated?
I do not think it is, because the road I marched on I consider a bad road, and the same character of country prevails till you get into the valley of the Salt River.
Question. Supposing an army giving battle in that position which the enemy occupied at Perryville and driven back on its left and compelled to fall back, what road would it be desirable for it to take; what would be the natural line of retreat?
Their natural line of retreat would he by the Harrodsburg road.
Question. Suppose our army compelled to fall back by an attack on its left, by what roads could it have retreated?
By the Springfield road.
Question. Any other road?
Yes, sir; it might have fallen back on the Lebanon road.
Question. I contend there was no question as to the result of a contest between my army and the rebel army; but supposing the chances to have been equal, which risked most - the rebel army, by exposing itself to be driven from the Harrodsburg pike by an attack on its left, or my army, by supposing it to be driven from the Mackville road?
I think the rebel army would be the most exposed.
Question. Would not the rebel army have been driven into an impracticable country, in which it must have been destroyed?
Yes, sir; I do not think it could have existed there had it been driven into that rough country; that is, Chaplin Hills. It could not have existed there, I think.
Question. But suppose in such an attack the left of the rebel army had not been turned, by what roads could it then have retreated?
Harrodsburg and Danville.
Question. Do you think, then, it was judicious to endeavor to cut off the enemy from the Danville road by attacking its left strongly?
I think it would have been a good movement.
Question. What orders were given on the night of the 8th in reference to the movements of the enemy on the morning of the 9th; that is, was an attack ordered upon the enemy's position?
On the night of the 8th of October I was at General Buell's headquarters about 12 or 1 o'clock. I met General Thomas there. I understood there was to be an attack in the morning, General Buell asked me the question if I would be ready to attack. I replied that my men were very weary and exhausted, but that we could go to work, and I understood that an attack was to be made from an order given to General Thomas. I did not see General Gilbert there, who commanded the other corps. I was very tired at the time myself and very sleepy. I had slept but very little the night before - about an hour.
Question. What part were you to take in the operations of the following day?
I was to act as a reserve.
Question. At what hour was the attack to be made?
At 6 o'clock in the morning.
Question. When the advance the following morning discovered that the enemy had retired, what position was your corps to take?
My corps was to take a position, the left resting on the Dicksville road or near it, to join on to Gilbert's left.
Question. Can you state where that was to have been?
No, sir. I know nothing about it. I went forward and selected my own position and found out where his left was - the other side of Chaplin River.
Question. Did you take that position the next day?
That is a point in my mind which I do not exactly remember. I think it was the second day, on the morning of the 9th, General Gay made a reconnaissance in my front, the order for which I gave the judge-advocate.
Question. Do you remember anything that prevented you from taking that position?
Nothing prevented me from moving. I think it was late on that day we moved.
I recollect posting my troops there and of going to ascertain the locality, but could not find General Gilbert, but I found General Mitchell, who was then on the left of General Gilbert's corps, and my troops and Rousseau’s division joined on with Mitchell's.
Question. You have spoken in your direct evidence of a road which you call the Dicksville and Springfield road; where does that road come into the Perryville and Springfield road?
I do not know the exact point on the road. There are a great many lines leading back and forth, but my impression is that it comes out near the road where there is a hospital. A man named Bottom lives there, but I cannot state the exact point, because the fences were considerably torn down, and I always rode in a direct direction.
Question. Was the country between the Perryville and Mackville road and the Perryville and Springfield road more practicable than the country bordering on Chaplin River?
Yes; it was. It was a country over which we could have moved.
Question. Did the movement which you proposed to make on the night of the 8th actually take place while you were at my headquarters?
It actually took place when I was at your headquarters and while I was on my way back.
Question. Did you not think that perhaps what you considered my refusal to give you an additional force referred to the disposition of the troops for the following day?
I did not understand it so.
Question. If that movement was actually being made while you were requesting troops, what would have been the necessity for troops or could they have been on the ground in time?
Yes, sir. I dispatched an aide-de-camp from your headquarters.
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. I understand, then, that the movement was executed by your orders?
Yes, sir.
By General BUELL:
Question. Did the result prove that the additional forces were necessary?
No, sir; because the enemy retreated.
Question. You have stated that I directed you to retreat by a certain road. Did you understand that I spoke of the retreat of the army or of your portion of it?
Only of my corps, if I was compelled to fall back on the Springfield road. I had no idea that the other portion of the army were going to fall back.
Question. Were you during the march from Louisville to Perryville kept in constant communication with the rest of the army and my headquarters?
Yes, sir; as constantly as it was possible to be. I dispatched couriers, who usually found you at your headquarters. On several occasions you wrote to me to have couriers at your headquarters, but I believe that every available and efficient order you gave reached me. My orderlies, when I directed them to your headquarters, would go to where they believed you were. Once they missed your headquarters when I was at Bloomfield.
Question. Was there anything in the nature of the country or the relative position of the forces that would have prevented the junction of Bragg's forces with those of Kirby Smith at Bardstown had they desired?
No, sir.
Question. Would it have been in the option of Bragg to give battle at Bardstown or avoid it for the purpose of forming such a junction?
Yes, sir.
Question. Was there anything in the position of our forces and the rebel forces to have prevented that junction from being formed at an earlier day had they desired?
No, sir; my impression was that that was what General Bragg was running for.
Redirect examination by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. Do you remember saying to Lew. Campbell, of Ohio, at Bowling Green, that there were only 25,000 ragged rascals, and that you thought it time to go and whip them?
I think I never made such a remark.
Question. Is your recollection of that impression such as would justify such a remark?
It is not. With different people coming in with different stories the matter was discussed, but I never believed their army was as small as that.
Question. You say that yon were impressed with the belief that Bragg would not invade Kentucky in the face of General Buell's army, and that he would not undertake it with less than 60,000 or 70,000 men?
That is my impression at that time.
Question. If General Bragg anticipated an uprising in Kentucky and assistance from Kirby Smith in that quarter, would it not have been more available for him to have taken 30,000 rather than 60,000 or 70,000; that is, in reference to his supplies?
Of course it would. He could then have moved with more celerity.
Question. If the enemy's number was as your estimate makes it, how do you account for the evacuation of so strong a place as Munfordville at your approach?
I do not know what the objects of the enemy were at that time. I merely formed my opinion from information gained since; but at that time I thought certainly that the enemy had as many men as General Buell had, and it was want of rations on their part that took them from Munfordville.
Question. In that connection can you account for the fact that an army of that size, after forming a junction with Kirby Smith, declined to fight at Harrodsburg or at Dick Robinson?
That is something I cannot understand why they did not fight there, where I expected them to fight; I cannot account for it; but General Buell's army was much increased in strength, and they may have known that we outnumbered them. I believe that with all the re-enforcements they got in Kentucky our army outnumbered them.
Question. What is your estimate, from all the information yon obtained, of Kirby Smith's forces?
Including his entire force I think Kirby Smith had about 20,000 men, including the, re-enforcements he got in Kentucky. I got that testimony from people in front of Cincinnati. I think he got about a thousand in Kentucky.
Question. At the time we occupied Munfordville after the enemy left do you know where Kirby Smith's army was?
We thought it was in front of Cincinnati or before Lexington or Franklin.
Question. You stated in your examination that Cincinnati was threatened, and not Louisville, by Kirby Smith?
By Smith, but not by the entire force. I do not know what there was in front of Cincinnati but raw recruits. I do not see why he did not take it.
Question. You said in your examination in chief that while encamped at Hubbard's Cove General Buell gave you his plan of operation.
His plan of concentration.
Question. What is the date of that, when he gave you a synopsis?
I think, sir, it was on the last day of August. I recollect I was about to move down to Altamont on the 1st, and I had already done it on the last day, if I remember, anticipating the order.
Commission adjourned to meet December 12, at 10 a.m.
NASHVILLE, December 12, 1862-10 a.m.
Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.
Examination of General McCook continued.
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. With an army under the command of Bragg less in number than that under General Buell, with a large force at Louisville, can you understand why Bragg was in no hurry to form a junction with Kirby Smith?
If I knew exactly the extent of Bragg's knowledge about our army and position I could understand it; not without.
Question. Was it possible that Bragg threw his army so boldly into Kentucky without knowing the number of the army in his rear?
That I do not know. Speculations can be made, and when the facts are known opinions can be formed; but I think Bragg was pretty well posted. His means of information were excellent. I think it was a part of his plans that Price should come up to Tennessee, but he ran against Rosecrans at Iuka. That is what he should have done, but running against Rosecrans prevented it.
Question. You estimated Kirby Smith's army, from all the information you could get, at about 20,000?
I so thought.
Question. Do you say that Kirby Smith and Bragg formed a junction at Harrodsburg?
I think they did. They could have done so and should have done so.
Question. Did not their refusal to meet you at a strong position at Harrodsburg and declining to fight you at Dick Robinson and making a hurried retreat from Kentucky satisfy you that you had overestimated their number there as you had at Munfordville?
No, sir; I have no reason to change it. I think they had about 60,000 men,
General SCHOEPF. What do you know of the dissatisfaction of the officers and men and the petition sent with respect to the removal of General Buell after the battle of Perryville?
I was informed while on the march from Danville to Lebanon that there was such a paper in existence in General Gilbert's corps; who was the originator of it I do not know. I never saw the paper. The first development of this feeling of dissatisfaction I discovered on the march from Nashville to Louisville. They complained of being marched to death and of being half fed. Another cause of this dissatisfaction was that General Buell was always very much engaged in his quarters and did not go around among his soldiers much. I have frequently felt that had he visited his camps more, reviewed his troops more, and shown himself more to his soldiers a different state of feeling would have existed. I always had confidence in General Buell as a general, and, thank God, I have yet.
By General BUELL:
Question. Do you know the names of the signers of the paper referred to?
I had a conversation with one of them outside the door here a few moments ago. I asked him about it, as to whether he ever heard of such a meeting of officers in the army wishing to depose General Buell and put General Thomas in command, and in this conversation with General Steedman he said he had signed a paper and had presided at a meeting of officers requesting the President to remove General Buell. I think General Steedman has confidence in General Buell, but was influenced by the junior officers and men in his command.
Question. Where was that meeting held?
I did not know, but somewhere on the Rolling Fork. I knew nothing for certain, but believe it was so. It was subsequent to the battle of Perryville; but their feeling was more particularly directed against General Gilbert.
Question. Did the paper state any reason?
I never saw the paper. It was merely mentioned on the way down, but it was by officers I had no control over. I knew of no other officers that signed it. General Steedman said it was a respectful petition to the President of the United States. He thought it the most direct road to the President.
Question. Did you ever hear of any similar proceedings on the part of officers of General Thomas' division, particularly in reference to their commanders?
Yes, sir; I did. Once, in front of Corinth, T. W. Sherman was put in command of General Thomas' division, which produced great dissatisfaction in the division, and the officers of the brigade and the colonels petitioned to have him removed. I know they were very much dissatisfied. They complained of his manner more than of his want of ability.
Question. Did you ever know of any other case?
Not that I recollect; that was the only instance.
Question. Was that division under my command at the time?
No, sir; it was assigned to the army of General Grant. I was requested by my deceased brother, General Robert [L.] McCook, to see General Buell and see if the change could be made; that the men were so angry with him that he might meet with violence from their hands. I spoke to General Buell about it, and it was one of his best divisions, and I know he as well as myself was much interested in their welfare.
Question. Do you know whether General Steedman's division was affected by the assignment of General Gilbert according to his supposed rank at that time?
Yes, sir; General Steedman ranks General Gilbert.
General SCHOEPF. Could it be known to General Steedman at the time that he was not a brigadier-general?
I believe Gilbert never had a commission as a major-general.
General BUELL. Has there been anything in the active operation of my troops, and in their scattered condition for a considerable time, that would have interfered with as frequent inspection of them as might otherwise have been made?
My answer to that is, yes.
By General BUELL:
Question. Did you have any doubt that Bragg would concentrate his forces at Harrodsburg for battle after the battle of the 8th?
I believed he would concentrate.
Question. What did you suppose his whole force would amount to?
At the time I had no positive way of ascertaining what his forces were, but I believe they would amount to about 55,000 men.
Question. Did you know the strength of our army after the battle of the 8th?
I did not sir, except as far as my own forces were concerned.
Question. Did you know that the absent division of your corps was on the march to join you?
Yes sir; I did.
Question. Was there anything on the retreat of the rebel forces from Perryville which indicated that the retreat was a disorderly one?
Not by the indications of their march. There was nothing left upon the road except that they could not carry away – gun-carriages and guns that were taken in battle – for they cut up the carriages and left them.
Question. Supposing that there was a reasonable probability that the enemy would give battle at Harrodsburg with a force not much, if any, inferior to your own and that you were in expectation of re-enforcements to join or would it be considered judicious to wait for these re-enforcements to join or would you have considered the result of battle so absolutely certain as to make it advisable to attack with what you had?
Yes, sir; I believe that the army we had there could have whipped them. That was my impression then and is my impression yet.
Question. Do you think it would necessarily have been so had the forces been nearly equal, considering the advantages the enemy would have in choice of position and the position being strong at Harrodsburg?
There would, of course, be a doubt about the matter. We had pursued Bragg a long distance, and if we could catch up with him I thought it would be the best policy.
Question. Did you consider the troops of which our army was composed at Perryville superior to the troops of the rebel army?
I believe the old troops I had were superior to the troops of the rebel army; my new troops were vastly inferior.
Question. What proportion of the whole army was composed of new troops?
There was one regiment of new troops to each brigade, and Jackson's division, consisting of two brigades, were all new troops. I suppose the army marching from Louisville was about 80,000 men.
Question. Supposing, then, that the two armies had been nearly equal and the advantages of position on the part of the enemy and that you were expecting re-enforcements, would it have been advisable to seek a battle under such circumstances?
If the armies had been nearly equal I would prefer to have waited. I will state that I never knew what the strength of our forces was on the advance till I saw General Buell's official report to-day, and I will say that they were much less than I thought they were. I was surprised and amazed to see it.
Question. Supposing the army after the battle of Perryville had taken position at Danville, would that necessarily have prevented the escape of the rebel army?
No, sir; they would have gone farther up the road; they would go out by Richmond.
Question. How far is Danville from the road which leads from Camp Dick Robinson to Lancaster?
Danville is about 8 miles from Camp Dick Robinson, and that is the nearest town on the road from Camp Dick Robinson to Lancaster; but Dick's River is the obstacle.
Question. Give the character of Dick's River.
Dick's River has precipitous bluffs and can be crossed only in one place.
Question. Would the occupation of Danville have prevented the enemy from retreating from Camp Dick Robinson by that road?
I think that the occupation of Danville would not, but we would have been in a position where the enemy could have been cut off from Lancaster. We should have been marching on his flank all the time had he attempted to move, but the enemy could not be reached on account of Dick's River till it was crossed, and we might have arrived simultaneously at Lancaster had we started at the same time.
Question. With such a stream as Dick's River between the armies would he have been in great danger?
Not in great danger till Dick's River was crossed by our army.
Question. Was it certain that the enemy would take a position at Camp Dick Robinson?
I thought so, but the thing was not developed till we left Harrodsburg.
Question. After it was ascertained that the enemy had gone to Camp Dick Robinson do you say that Danville was a proper position for our army to take?
Certainly it was. It was the only position left.
By General TYLER:
Question. You do not mean to say, general, that their army, man for man, was superior to ours?
The material of our army is as good or superior to that of the rebel.
Commission adjourned to meet on December 13, 1862, at 10 a.m.
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