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After dinner, from a stand between a large oak tree on the crest of a hill where the Third Ohio lost heavily during the battle, the speech making began and the visitors listened to the speeches while sitting under the shade of trees, which were scarred by the bullets imbedded in the tress from the battle. The visitors were within sight of areas where the dead from both sides laid upon the battlefield.
Colonel Logan McKee introduced Union General Speed Fry gave an eloquent welcoming speech. Colonel W. S. Furay, of Columbus, Ohio, Judge M. H. Owsley, of Lancaster, and John Beatty, of Columbus, Ohio, who was colonel of the 3rd Ohio Infantry, was introduced and gave speeches. John Beaty’s speech was the longest. John Beaty. was born near Sandusky, Ohio and entered the banking business in Morrow County, Ohio. In the 1860 election, he was the Presidential elector for the Abraham Lincoln/Hannibal ticket. When the Civil War started Beatty volunteered as a private in the 3rd Ohio Infantry, serving in western Virginia. By 1863, he was commissioned as a brigadier general following his distinguished service in the Battle of Perryville, the Battle of Stones River, and the Tullahoma Campaign. He took command of a brigade of infantry and led his brigade through the rest of the war. Beatty participated in the Tullahoma Campaign, the Battle of Chickamauga, and the successful Union attack on Missionary Ridge during the Chattanooga Campaign. In January 1864, he resigned his commission and turned to banking. After the war, he represented Ohio in the U.S. Congress from 1868 to 1873. He also served as a presidential elector in 1884 for the Blaine/Logan ticket. In 1879, he wrote The citizen-soldier, or, Memoirs of a volunteer, describing his career during the Civil War. On December 21, 1914, he died in Columbus, Franklin County, Ohio and was buried in Oakland Cemetery, Sandusky, Erie County, Ohio.
In his speech, Beaty blamed Union General Phil Sheridan, commander of the 11th Division, under brevet General Charles Gilbert, Ebenezer Gay’s cavalry brigade, brevet General Charles Gilbert, commander of the III Corps, for the Union loss at the Battle of Perryville. In his speech, he said:
General Lovell H. Rousseau was a Kentuckian who entered the volunteer service from civil life. He was a tall, handsome man of good education and high courage. His command in October 1862 consisted of three brigades of infantry and four batteries of artillery: The brigades were Colonel William Lytle’s 17th Brigade, Colonel John Starkweather’s 28th Brigade, and Colonel Leonard Harris’ 9th Brigade. The batteries in the 17th Brigade were the 5th Indiana Battery Light Artillery under Captain Peter Simonson, the 1st Michigan Light Artillery under Captain Cyrus Loomis, the 4th Indiana Battery Light Artillery, under Captain Asabel Bush, and the 1st Kentucky Light Battery “A.” Around noon on October 8, Rousseau advanced the 17th Brigade and Ninth Brigade of his division eastwardly along the Mackville Road to the brow of the little ridge on which we stand, his object being to reach the creek beyond and obtain water for his men. He and his staff and Lytle and his staff were riding at the head of the column. The Third Ohio marching by the flank followed immediately behind them. As Rousseau was about to descend into the valley, the enemy opened with a vigorous fire upon him from their batteries on the hills to the east. He at once halted the column and after a hurried consultation with Lytle the 3rd Ohio was ordered to countermarch to the foot of a hill it had just ascended and file off of the Mackville Road. In the position to which were thus assigned the higher ground in our front protected us from the enemy’s guns and we retained it for nearly two hours, during which –for part of the time at least there was in progress a furious interchange of shot and shell passing over our heads between Loomis and Simonson’s batteries near the Russell House and the Confederate batteries on the high ground beyond Doctor’s Fork of the Chaplin River.iii.
About 2 o’clock in the afternoon the enemy’s infantry was seen approaching and the 3rd, moving to the crest of the ridge, took position with his left on the Mackville Road and its right resting near a barn, which an hour later was fired by exploding shells and burned to the ground. The Fifteenth Kentucky, under Col. Curran Pope, was at this time 2 o’clock in reserve ready to move either to the right, left, or front as the exigencies of battle might require. The 10th Ohio and the 42nd Indiana were on the left of the road and to their left of the road and to their left, stretching off northwardly on the high ground was Harris brigade, with Terrill’s brigade of Jackson’s division, in its rear, on the left of Terrill, and well refused, was Starkweather’s brigade of Rousseau’s division.
It will be observed from the line indicated that Starkweather’s brigade was on the extreme left of McCook’s Corps and the Third Ohio and the 15th Kentucky on the extreme right. The latter regiments, however, were not by any means on the right. Of the Federal army, Sheridan’s division of Gilbert’s Corps lay in the woods and fields south of us with its left a few hundred years away and its center on the Springfield Road. A little later in the day Mitchell’s division went into line just behind Sheridan. And at 3 o’clock Schoepf’s division advanced on the Springfield Road and crossing Doctor’s Fork, about one mile in the rear of Mitchell. But even these were not the only Union troops on our right on that day and eager for battle. Beyond Sheridan off toward the Lebanon Road was Crittenden’s corps consisting of Wood’s, Van Cleve’s, and Smith’s divisions-about 20,000 men. There were then on this field within striking distance during the afternoon of October 8, 1862, 58,000 Union soldiers, while on the Confederate side there were but three divisions-Cheatham’s, Anderson’s, and Buckner’s.-16,000 men all told including the cavalry.
How did it happen, therefore, that the battle was so disastrous to the National Arms? The explanation is simply this: the three divisions on the right of the line-Wood’s, VanCleve’s, and Smith’s-owning to the direction in which a stiff wind was blowing, heard no musketry and as they were not notified that a battle was in progress, concluded from the artillery firing alone that no serious engagement was taking place and hence took no part in it. The three divisions of the center corps however and a portion of cavalry under Gay, whose line was a mile in our rear, stretching from the Springfield Road to the Mackville Road, were spectators of the conflict and knew from personal observation how furious and terrible it was, but this infantry and cavalry were unfortunately in the hands that day of lieutenants or captains of the regular army who held their impatient and eager soldiers in check, while Polk with Cheatham’s division and Wharton’s cavalry assailed and after a vigorous contest scattered the raw recruits of Terrill’s brigade then holding one brigade (Maney’s) and the cavalry to keep up the right with Starkweather, sent Donelson and Stewart to reinforce Bucker and Anderson, who with one division and three brigades were pounding away on Lytle and Harris.
When these two brigades of Rousseau were being assaulted and hammered to exhaustion by over two divisions of Confederate troops, and while 3,300 Union soldiers were falling either dead or wounded, on the crest of the ridge and while the enemy were swarming on our front and around our right, Sheridan, now the general of the United States army, with a strong division lay near by the south of us, menaced and held by a single brigade of Confederate troops (Powell’s), which subsequently was driven by one brigade of (Carlin’s) of Mitchell’s division pell-mell through the streets of Perryville. But Sheridan, alas, could not move to the assistance of McCook without an order from Gilbert and the latter could not permit him to move without an order from General Buell and although Gen. Buell was not far away ready to receive information from his various corps, and, if need were, help them, he was not advised of the situation by his lieutenants and did not know until 4 o’clock that the battle was on!
Where were the signal corps, the fleet couriers and the dashing staff, whose function it was to transmit intelligence from every division of the long line to the commander, that he by a word might quicken the army into life and compel unity of action? They were there, of course, but lieutenants in charge of divisions and army corps forgot to use them! And Gay, the chief of cavalry, standing with his men unoccupied midway between the fighting column and Gen. Buell’s headquarters, neither moved forward to help the one nor backward to advise the other. McCook appealed to the center corps for help, but before any assistance must be rendered the appeal must be referred to Gilbert, and when Gilbert was found the request must be sent to Buell and when Buell was reached it was nearly night, and in the meantime the roll of musketry on McCook’s front was continuous and the thunder of artillery was heard at Danville, at Harrodsburg, and even at Lancaster, 20 miles away.
Why was there not someone on this field, like Gordon Granger at Chickamauga, who could recognize the boom of the cannon and the volleys of musketry as an imperative order from God Almighty to march to the front and participate in the battle?
It would not be true, however, to say that with 40,000 idle men at hand no help at all was extended us, for Gooding’s brigade of Mitchell’s division was finally sent over to our assistance. It was a brigade of veteran soldiers and bravely led. It did good service and lost heavily, but it should have come two or three hours before, accompanied by a full division of Gilbert’s Corps. The Confederate army was within the grasp of the national forces. If the hand of the latter had been put vigorously forth the former would have been crushed. No one saw this more clearly than Bragg and Polk, and so, having struck their blow and ascertained the national strength and their own weakness they hurriedly left us to weep over the loss of friends and curse the martinets who permitted a victory to be snatched away when by the exercise of a little common sense it might have been secured with even fewer casualties than we sustained. But these captains and lieutenants on the roster of the regular army should perhaps not be too severely censured. They probably did the best they knew how to do. The only thing they at least time had in common with great military leaders was their uniform-the gold lace, buttons, and stars. They appeared well on dress parade and subsequently attained some practical knowledge of the art of war, and rendered valuable service to the country, but it cost the lives of thousands of brave men to qualify them for the high positions to which they were prematurely assigned. They were in fact at first no better fitted to command corps and divisions than the youngest graduate of a law school to sit on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The difference in respect of education, intellectual vigor, and experience between the private soldier in the rear rank and commander of brigades, divisions, and corps was often so slight that if their positions had been reversed during the first years of the war, it is not at all probable that the final result would have been materially affected. The consequences of incapacity and inexperience were witnessed in almost every engagement and luck not skill was generally if not always the arbiter of battles. If Bragg had been a great general he would have abandoned Kentucky without fighting the battle of Perryville, and if after the battle was begun the Union forces had been in competent hands the Confederate army would have been annihilated. It is difficult to decide just now which party-Federals or Confederates-is entitled to the credit of having rendered the biggest fool conspicuous in history, but the North with its customary generosity is, I am quite sure, willing to concede this honor to our Confederate friends.
With a mental reservation of a few honorable names, it may be said that about the only intelligent fighting which the generals of either army have ever done they are doing now. The periodicals are full of the smoke of it. Sherman strikes at Buell and Buell at Sherman and so along the whole line the generals are smiting each other with a vigor they never manifested on the field. I am prepared to believe the worse they can say of each other, and don’t care which wins. There are not enough of them now on friendly terms to make a good company reunion. It is about the first earnest fighting many of them have ever done, and I hope they will keep it up until the next war, so that they may be able to enter it with some little valuable information in the line of their profession. The most that can be said of their connection with the last war is that they put their troops into battle and then left them to get out as best they could. Sometimes, as at Missionary Ridge , the boys broke away from them entirely and won a victor in total disregard of orders, and in violation of all rules of war taught at West Point and in a manner wholly subversive of military discipline and in utter contempt of the most approved authorities; but of course the generals were not responsible for all this-the boys would do it in spite of them.
If McCook had been in possession of his full corps the Confederates would have been whipped on the 8th day of October ’62 without help from anybody, but Sill’s veteran division was at or near Frankfort and so the battle was really fought not by McCook’s corps as a whole, but by one division of veterans under Rousseau and two brigades of raw recruits under Jackson.
To these were opposed three divisions of veteran troops, less one brigade (Powell’s) operating under the personal supervision and direction of Bragg, Polk, Cheatham, Hardee, Anderson, and Buckner.
General McCook in his report says: “The battle was principally fought by Rousseau’s division and if there are, or ever, were better soldiers than old troops engaged, I have never seen nor read of them.”
General Bragg in his report says: “The action opened at 12:30 pm, between the skirmishers and artillery on both sides . . . .The engagement became general soon thereafter and was continued furiously from that time until dark. . . . For the time engaged it was the severest engagement within my knowledge.”
Rousseau’s division lost in killed and wounded 2,191, Jackson’s division (two brigades) 1,107; total loss in McCook’s corps 3,298.
Gooding, who came over, from Mitchell with one brigade to help us lost 499; total loss on the left 3,798.
The loss sustained by the 40,000 national troops on our right was 386 and most, if not the whole, of this loss occurring in skirmishes which preceded the battle. Many brigades did not fire a gun and some divisions did not lost a man.
Colonel Dan McCook, who commanded a brigade in Sherman’s division, said: I turned round and saw the barn on General Rousseau’s right in flames, and saw the rebels in three lines in line of battle. . . .They were so near I could see daylight through their ranks with my glass. I saw them envelope and drive back Lytle’s right flank. At that time our division, with two batteries was lying idle. I begged General Sheridan to at least allow us to open on them with artillery. . . .The answer I received to this earnest entreaty was that it might concentrate the fire of the enemy’s artillery upon our troops. This came to me from General Gilbert through General Sheridan.”
General Steedman testified that the enemy “would have been utterly defeated had a single division been added to the strength already engaged.”
General Speed S. Fry said: “I think they (the enemy) were satisfied. . . .that if our army had been hurled upon them at Perryville, they would either have been captured or scattered to the winds.” Generals Sheridan and Fry were both right.
The military commission appointed to investigate and request the operations of the army under General Buell found with respect to the battle of Perryville:
1. The battle begun at 2:00 o’clock
2. The contest was obstinate and bloody
3. The duration of the battle was about five hours
4. The severest fighting was on McCook’s right
5. McCook’s right was not to exceed three hundred yards from Gilbert’s left.
6. Assistance did not reach McCook until about dark.
7. General Buell’s headquarters were two and a half miles from the front on the Springfield Road.
8. He had no intelligence of the attack on McCook until 4 o’clock in the evening.
9. During a greater part of attack on McCook, Gilbert’s corps was unengaged, while Thomas’s wing had not so much as a demonstration made against it.
10. All of Bragg’s army at Perryville was flung upon McCook.
General Buell says: “But for lack of timely information of the condition of things on the afternoon of October 8 the main portion of the enemy’s force at Perryville would have been captured.”
Again he says: “The signal corps was in operation and signal stations established to communicate intelligence from different parts of the line to my headquarters. What further precaution could be required, except the presence of commanders whose duty to communicate with me was as well understood as though it had been prescribed in their commissions.”
General Buell has been severely criticized for not being nearer the front on the day of battle, but in justice to him it should be stated that owing to the fact that his horse had fallen on him the day before, he was physically unable to ride the line even if it had been prudent and wise for him to do so, but if there had been no accident, and if he had been physically able to inspect the front, there was no good reason, so far as he could see, why he should do it personally. He had, in addition to General Thomas, who was on the right, three corps commanders on the field whose duty it was to report to him every fluctuation in the fortunes of the day. He had eight division commanders and one chief of cavalry also, all of whom he had reason to believe would advise him at once of any threatening disaster.
In the absence of any approval from them for help, he had grounds for believing that no aid was needed. The head should not be blamed because the hands given it to work with will did not do their customary duty. No general of any army of 60,000 men should be in its immediate front, not should he be changing from point to point along the line. His place is in the rear, where the commanders of the various corps may find him, and where intelligence may be sent by courier or by signal. Hooker was imprudently too near the front at Chancellorsville, and, being wounded, the army was for three hours at the crisis of the battle without a head, and in consequence suffered a terrible defeat. At Chantilly General Phil Kearney, riding to the front, was killed inside the enemy’s line, and so, at the crisis of that battle the Union forces were suddenly left without a leader. McPherson fell at Atlanta while doing in person what should have been entrusted to a subordinate and the Army of the Tennessee was greatly embarrassed by his death. The chief of a great many armies must necessarily trust largely to the intelligence and vigilance of his division and corps commanders. It is impossible for him to be present at all points and give personal direction to the numerous parts which go to make up the whole. It is not this function to fire a musket, or supervise personally the operations of a brigade or a division. If he were to undertake to do either of the things mentioned his usefulness as a commander of the whole would be impaired, because his opportunities to supervise and direct the whole would be diminished.
General Buell’s three corps at Perryville were in good position and well abreast. The signal stations to McCook and Gilbert had been established, a messenger could have been signaled to him from the left and center in five minutes. A courier could have reached him from the front in fifteen. But Gilbert, Sheridan, and Gay, with a stupidity unparalleled in history neglected to advise him of the situation, while McCook, hurried, confused, and distracted by the disasters occurring in his immediate presence lost his mental equipoise and failed to avail himself of the lines of speedy communication with his commander, which had been established for his special use. I do not blame McCook. He was young in experience and had much to worry him. But I do think that Gay and Sheridan should have been censured and Gilbert dismissed. And this I believe will be the verdict of impartial history.
Gen. Beatty’s address was listened to with great interest and frequently applauded. After he had finished, Hon. M. H. Owsly of Kentucky spoke a few earnest words for the union of the states and was followed by Colonel W. S. Furay of Columbus, who, in a speech of half an hour, closed the exercises of the occasion. The great crowd then dispersed and the Ohio people returned at sundown to Danville.
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